RELIGION AS PUBLIC RESOURCE
Angela C. Carmella
Ten years ago I was an associate in a Boston law firm. We represented the Jesuit fathers in their plans to renovate and dramatically redesign the interior of the beautiful sanctuary of the Immaculate Conception Church in the South End. Because of a public outcry against the
renovation, the Boston Landmarks Commission intervened to designate
the church interior a landmark in order to control the manner and extent
of redesign.
My astonishment grew as the central issue became clear: the fight
would be over the altars. The Jesuits wanted only one new central altar;
the Commission wanted the three existing altars to remain, and also
wanted a hand in designing the new altar to ensure its aesthetic harmony
with the rest of the sanctuary.
The Jesuits ended up in litigation against the Landmarks Commission and, long after I left practice, ultimately prevailed. In 1990, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that under the Massachusetts
Constitution the Jesuits enjoyed the freedom to design their sanctuary as
they saw fit. The possible loss of architectural heritage was the price we
must pay for religious liberty.'
The Jesuits' plight caught the attention of "separationists" who emphasize the need to maintain a high wall of separation between church
and state. The Jesuits' free exercise claim and the "wall of separation"
metaphor, typically viewed as serving very different purposes, in this
case served the same purpose: religious freedom was ensured by keeping
the state out of the religious group's affairs.2 The metaphor worked be-
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1 See generally Society of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmark Comm'n, 564
N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990). For a detailed discussion of the issues arising in church preservation cases, see Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship and Religious Liberty: ConstitutionalLimits to Landmark Preservation and ArchitecturalReview, 36 ViLL. L. REV.
401 (1991).
2 Separationist theory contains both Jeffersonian (or enlightenment) and evangelical
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cause the Jesuits were an identifiable religious group and the sanctuary
was their most sacred space. The state's presence profaned that space.
Beyond the metaphor, the interior space of the church could be quite literally "walled off" from the state's reach.
The decision of the Massachusetts high court was right: the Landmarks Commission could not make a museum out of this church building.
I have, however, revisited the controversy that surrounded the case many
times to try to understand the intense public reaction to the proposed
renovation, particularly the fact that opposition came from Catholics and
non-Catholics alike. Obviously many in the congregation itself were upset because they saw the proposed changes as unwarranted, a slap in the
face to earlier generations who had financed, built, and prayed at the altars the Jesuits now sought to remove. In addition to the churchgoers,
many spoke out: neighborhood residents, outsiders, and public officials
alike were outraged. Concertgoers who had enjoyed organ music there
protested that the organ would never sound the same again. Citizens who
loved the space argued that the church's tax-exempt status entitled the
city to prevent the renovation. The renovation was referred to as
"desecration."
At first I attributed the intensity of the public reaction to extremist
tendencies present in the historic preservation movement, particularly
those that would advocate preservation of any beautiful structure without
regard to any other factor. But as I continued to reflect on the matter, I
realized a very simple fact: the church building was considered a
"public" resource.
By the word "public" I do not mean
"governmental." I use the word to describe the overwhelming sense of
ownership of, and access to, the faith and the fruits of the faith-great
music, art, and architecture-felt by churchgoers, by people of many religious backgrounds, by people with no religious background. Of course
I do not mean ownership as in equitable ownership, or access as in legal
access to a public accommodation, but ownership and access in the sense
that this church was given to the world. It "belonged" (in this psychological and social sense) not only to its Jesuit owners or even to its com(or pietistic) notions: the former emphasizes protection of the state from the church's
reach, but the latter emphasizes protection of the church from the state's reach. See generally Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A NATION DEDICATED TO REUGIOUS
LBERTY: THE CONSTITTONAL HErAGE OF THE REUGION CLAUSES (1990). Thus, it is
not surprising that separationist theory is often consistent with religious exemptions (or
"exit rights") from burdensome laws. Such exemptions (such as exemptions from historic
preservation laws) enable religious communities to practice their faith without government
regulation or intervention- freedom to flourish on the other side of the wall, so to speak.
See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), wherein Justice Burger found that
the threat of state entanglement in the affairs of churches justified tax exemption for religious organizations.
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munity of worshippers, but to everyone. Because this building had such
a great impact on the larger community, the Landmarks Commission, together with the public, assumed that even the sanctuary came within the
government's jurisdiction to steward public resources.
The public reaction captured intuitively the public character of religion. Throughout this century, theologians and sociologists of religion
have noted that, at least among Christian communities, the orientation of
a faith group toward the society tends to fall in either one of two categories: sect or church.' "Sects" stand apart from civil society, call people
out of it to join them, and focus their efforts on the spiritual well-being
of the small group of adherents. But "churches" in this sect-church dichotomy do not call people out from civil society. Churches address people at their location within civil society and are concerned for the wellbeing of the society as a whole. Churches are convinced that they have
responsibilities to everyone, not only their adherents. The term "public
church" has emerged to describe this phenomenon of a religious community offering itself in service to the wider society
The field of public
theology has emerged to describe the ways in which religious communities participate in the civil conversation and offer themselves, their traditions, their narratives, and their symbols as public resources to the culture.' Theologians have criticized the notion that religion is "private":
3 These categories of church and sect come out of the study of Christian theology,
and particularly of ecclesiology, and were developed most fully in the work of Ernst
Troeltsch. See 1 and 2 ERNST TROELTSCH, THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCHES (Olive Wyon trans., Westminster/John Knox Press 1992) (1931). For a discussion of other typologies, see Angela C. Carmella, A Theological Critique of Free Exercise Jurisprudence,60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 782 (1992) and Angela C. Carmella, The
Religion Clauses and Acculturated Religious Conduct: Boundaries for the Regulation of
Religion, in THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN MONITORING AND REGULATING REUIGION IN
PUBUC LIFE (James E.Wood, Jr. & Derek Davis eds., 1993).
The paradigmatic Christian "sect" is a small group of people called out from civil
society to be a community of perfection. It has nothing to say to civil society. But the
paradigmatic "church" sees itself as embracing many, both saints and sinners. It has
much to say to civil society because nothing is beyond the reach of God's transformative
grace-even politics and the market. A "church" therefore is committed to engaging and
caring for the whole world; its strong sense of co-responsibility (with other institutions)
for social conditions and public life reaches far beyond the realm of its members. For the
sect, however, attempts to transform the world are hopeless and involve unacceptable
compromise. It stands over against the world not to change it but rather to call people out
of it for the sole purpose of living as a witness to the Gospel. While these categories relate primarily to the Christian tradition, they describe phenomena of engagement and
withdrawal that occur in most religious traditions.
4 See, e.g., MICHAEL J.HIMES & KENNETH R. HIMES, FULLNESS OF FAITH: THE
PUBUC SIGNIFICANCE OF THEOLOGY (1993); MARTIN E. MARTY, THE PUBuC CHURCH:
MAINUNE-EVANGEUCAL-CATHOUC (1981).
5 Public theology emerges from the paradigmatic "church," see supra note 3, because that ecclesiological category possesses a strong sense of responsibility for partici-
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religion may be "profoundly personal," 6 but it is publicly proclaimed,
publicly shared and open to public scrutiny.
If churches-using the word in its sociological sense-create and
contribute public resources to our public life, then who is the proper
steward of those resources? Certainly, in the Boston Landmarks case,
the Immaculate Conception Church was a "public resource" not simply
for the Jesuits' private use. It was for everyone, and it remains to this
day a place of public activity, public service to the wider community and
great public beauty (even after the renovation). But that did not mean the
government was a capable steward of that resource; in fact, the court
prohibited the government from playing that role. Only the religious
group could appropriately steward that public resource because it is the
role of the religious group to define, create, and offer that resource as it
sees fit.
Recognizing the primacy of the Jesuits in the control of this resource
was the correct result, and for me the only correct one in a constitutional
system that protects religious liberty. But the legal analysis that leads to
that result radically redefines a "church" to be a "sect." To be given the
definitional freedom vis-k-vis their public resources, the Jesuits were
treated not as a church with public resources but as a sect engaged in its
pating in public life to help shape and define the "res publics," the common good, and
the public order of the larger society. Catholicism and most Protestant communities fit
within this conception of "church." See, e.g., MICHAEL J. HIMS & KENNETH R. HIMES,
FULLNEss OF FAITH: THE PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THEOLOGY (1993); MARTIN E.
MARTY, THE PUBLIC CHURCH:
MAINLINE-EVANGELICAL-CATHOLIC (1981); JOHN
COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE
AMERICAN PROPOSITION (1960); RONALD F. TkHEMANN, CONSTRUCTING A PUBLIC
THEOLOGY: THE CHURCH IN A PIJRAUSTIC CULTURE (1991); RONALD F. THIEMANN,
RELIGION IN PUBuC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR DEMOCRACY (1996) [hereinafter THIEMANN,
RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE].

Public theology addresses the theological task of speaking in and to the society.
Public theology takes seriously the encounter with the religious pluralism and the broader
pluralism of our culture. Public theology is not nostalgic for any "good old days," nor
does it draw on notions of civil religion. It seeks dialogue with others of good will.
"[Piublic theology asks for no acceptance from people beyond what truth it can illuminate
and make persuasive through public conversation and argument." HIMES & HIMES, supra, at 22. Religion can be part of the conversation because "fundamental orienting convictions are accessible to public inquiry and critique." TIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC
LIFE, supra, at 154. The American bishops' pastoral letters addressed to the American
people are often pointed to as good examples of how a particular religious group speaks
in and to the culture. The Catholic Church "has no proper mission in the political, economic or social order, but it has a significant role to play in giving moral shape and direction to the political, economic and social order." Richard P. McBrien, The Future of
the Church in American Society, in RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN MILIEU 91
(Leslie Griffin ed., 1986).
6 THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE, supra note 5, at 155.
7 See id. at 131-35.

19971

RELIGION AS PUBLIC RESOURCE

1229

private affairs and walled off in its own sanctuary.
The privatization of public religious resources in legal discourse has
created real problems for the way Americans understand religion. Stephen Carter's recent book, The Culture of Disbelief, eloquently expresses
how an over-emphasis on the wall metaphor and the private, sectarian vision of religion in the legal context has resulted in criticism of religious
activism on the moral dimension of public issues.8 I can well imagine the
outcry if, after the Jesuits had been given the freedom to renovate their
sanctuary, they had tried to mount a vigorous anti-abortion or anti-war
campaign. People might have said, "You have nothing to say in the public square! Go pray in your sanctuary!" Professor Carter reminds us that
two of the most important roles of religion are public ones: as an independent moral voice that provides people with the capacity to resist the
state, and as a source of moral understanding that builds and sustains
virtue in citizens and institutions. Faith groups are thus capable of giving us not only great buildings and great art but ideas and insights into
the sacredness of life and the human condition, and a horizon outside of
history that can provide perspective on all our endeavors. Public theology can help to define and specify these religious resources offered to the
society and articulate a proper understanding of the public character of
religion.
If religious traditions are themselves public resources, and create
public resources, what then is the appropriate legal posture of the state
toward these resources? We could continue to require the state to acknowledge religion as private and sectarian; that certainly worked to
protect the Jesuits." In fact, there is a strong argument that characterizing religion as a sectarian endeavor gives it a uniqueness that justifies

8

See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN

LAW AND POITICS TRIVIALIZE REuGIOUS DEVOITON (1993).

9 See id. at 36.
10 Another approach would be to ignore the question altogether and simply treat re-

ligion like other things- religion as speech, religion as social service, religion as association, religion as opinion. This is the approach of the proposed Religious Equality
Amendment. See H.R.J. Res. 184, 104th Cong. (1996). For commentary on this proposal, see generally Richard F. Duncan, Public Schools and the Inevitability of Religious
Inequality, 1996 BYU L. REv. 569 (1996); John Frohnmayer, Praying the Constitution
Survives, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 937 (1996); John H. Garvey, All Things Being Equal...,
1996 BYU L. REV. 587 (1996); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Introduction: An Ambivalent
View of the Religious Equality Amendment, 1996 BYU L. REV. 561 (1996); Sanford

Levinson, ConstitutionalImperfection, JudicialMisinterpretation,and the Politics of Constitutional Amendment:

Thoughts Generated by Some Current Proposals to Amend the

Constitution, 1996 BYU L. REv. 611 (1996); Steven T. McFarland, The Necessity and
Impact of the ProposedReligious Equality Amendment, 1996 BYU L. REv. 627 (1996);
Rodney K. Smith, Converting the Religious Equality Amendment into a Statute with a Lit-

tle "Conscience, " 1996 BYU L. REv. 645 (1996).
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special protections under the Free Exercise Clause and special disabilities
under the Establishment Clause. On the other hand, we could attempt to
give legal expression to the theological and sociological notion of religion
as public resource. What would this look like? Would such a theory
entail giving the state affirmative stewardship of those resources?
To consider this question of state stewardship of religious resources,
we must shift from the situation involving an identifiable religious group
with a public resource, like the case of the Jesuits, to a situation where
religious resources, such as ideas, language, texts, images, and symbols,
are not connected to any particular group. This moves us from cases involving free exercise of religion to those involving establishment concerns. In fact, the most fundamental question implied in Establishment
Clause cases is whether a particular state action is an appropriate stewardship of religious resources.
The cases concerning religion and public education are particularly
interesting. Public education is the state's most significant normative undertaking; thus, the important question becomes whether the state must be
a steward of public religious resources or whether it cannot be. Recall
the Kentucky case in which the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the posting of the Ten Commandments on classroom walls."'
Are the Ten Commandments private or public in character, or both? Do
they have something to say only to Jewish and Christian communities, or
to everyone? If they are public, can the state be a steward of these religious resources in a way that it could not be the steward of the sanctuary design? Or does placement of the sacred text in a government building profane that text, much like the involvement of the government
profaned the Jesuits' sanctuary?
The Kentucky Legislature thought the commandments were public
resources because of their status as "the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States." 1" The Supreme Court also acknowledged that the Ten Commandments were public
resources when taught as part of the study of history, civilization, comparative religion, or ethics. This lack of teaching context proved dispositive. The mere posting of the text, without more, was seen as a private, devotional act that lacked public, educational value, and thus,
would violate the Establishment Clause. 3
It seems that religious resources, once defined as private, are automatically outside the appropriate stewardship of the state. Teacher-led
See generally Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
Id. at 41.
13 It was "sacred text" that the children might "read,
haps... venerate and obey." Id. at 41-42.
"
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Bible reading" and prayer" in the classroom are considered private devotional activities and are, therefore, impermissible. Bible reading and
prayer are permissible in public schools only when a limited public forum
is created, such as a non-curricular club period, in which all speech is
welcome."' The state in this situation is not steward of the religion but is
steward only of the forum in which all sorts of private speech, including
religious speech, occurs. Thus, regardless of whether religion is excluded from or included in the public school's life, the judiciary tends to
characterize religion as private and sectarian in nature. While I do not
intend to criticize the result of any particular case, it is clear that the legal discourse persists in "privatizing" what theologians would call public
religious resources.
The implications of a jurisprudence that acknowledged the public
character of religion are unclear. Would it necessarily involve the government in a stewardship role? Would the Jesuits' sanctuary be considered within the jurisdiction of the state because it is a public resource?
Would such an acknowledgment erode settled Free Exercise and Establishment Clause precedent that has relied on sectarian definitions of religious conduct, or would we find other doctrines to protect religion
while more accurately describing its public character? Would it improve
our jurisprudence, or would it defeat precisely the types of protections
the First Amendment is designed to offer? Would it clarify or further
confuse? The answers lie outside the scope of this essay. But one thing
is certain. There already exists government stewardship of public religious resources. Hence, the question is not whether it is ever legitimate
for the state to steward such resources, but rather when and how and under what conditions. And the importance of the question grows as our
national religious diversity grows. 7
This stewardship is, and will be in the near future, most prevalent in
the public school curriculum. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed
in its public school cases under the Establishment Clause that nothing in
these decisions prevents schools from teaching about religion."
The
14 See generally School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203

(1963).
15 See generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38 (1985); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
16 See generally Board of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226 (1990). See also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510
(1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
17 See generally Diana L. Eck, Neighboring Faiths: How Will Americans Cope with
IncreasingReligious Diversity?, 99 HARV. MAG. 38 (1996).
IS This is different from Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), and Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), where the Court held that the curriculum was teaching
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study of religion in art, music, literature, history, ethics, and many other
areas is both permissible and encouraged. But it is harder than it may
seem. Groups devoted to the study of religion in the public school have
been working for years on curriculum reform, and educators have begun
to focus on this task.19 A growing number of states, including California,
have begun to implement plans for the comprehensive study of religion.'
Here we have an area completely outside Establishment Clause scrutiny,
and yet government is permitted a major stewardship role over religion as
a public resource.
The biggest threat of governmental stewardship of public religious
resources, whether it be in the public school curriculum or in the efforts
to preserve church buildings, is not that religion will be profaned or
tainted by the state's involvement (though that is a concern), but that religion will be treated as something dead, something worthy of observation and study only because it once inspired and motivated, as if a museum piece." But religious traditions are living traditions, and to avoid
their "death" at the hands of a government that acts more as curator than
as steward, I offer no solution. I can suggest only that we look for illumination in public theology. Perhaps in their conversation with the institutions of society, including agencies of government, public theologians can offer clarifying insights on these perplexing issues.

religion.
19 See, e.g., Guide Tells How to Teach About Religion in Schools, L.A. TIMES, June
1, 1988, at 5; Peter Steinfels, Trend Gaining in Public Schools to Add Teaching About
Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1989, § 1 at 1; Laura Sessions Stepp, Coalition Promotes
Teaching About Religion in Schools, WASH. POST, June 1, 1988, at Al.
2 See Jim Castelli, Schools Take Up Religion as an Academic Study, USA TODAY,
Nov. 6, 1990, at 4D; Judith Cebula, After Years of Caution, Educators Reconsider
Teaching of Religion, INDIANAPOUS STAR, Mar. 21, 1996, at D01; Larry Whitham,

Fourth R Winning Respect in School, WASH. TMES, Dec. 27, 1991, at F3.
21 The Supreme Court struggles with this public-private issue most awkwardly in the
cases concerning public displays of religious symbols. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).

